

Copyright
by
Carmen Marie Gutierrez
2013

**The Thesis Committee for Carmen Marie Gutierrez
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:**

**Casting A Crime Net, Catching Immigrants:
An Analysis of Secure Communities' Effects on the Size of Foreign-
Born Mexican Populations**

**APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:**

Supervisor:

David Kirk

Mary Rose

**Casting A Crime Net, Catching Immigrants:
An Analysis of Secure Communities' Effects on the Size of Foreign-
Born Mexican Populations**

by

Carmen Marie Gutierrez, B.A.

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts

**The University of Texas at Austin
December 2013**

Abstract

Casting A Crime Net, Catching Immigrants: An Analysis of Secure Communities' Effects on the Size of Foreign- Born Mexican Populations

Carmen Marie Gutierrez, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Supervisor: David Kirk

Following the precedent decision to expand the power of immigration enforcement set by the Immigration and Nationality Act Section 287(g), the Department of Homeland Security developed its own partnership agreement with local police to increase detection and deportation efforts through its 2008 policy, Secure Communities (S-Comm). S-Comm represents the nation's "largest expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation's history" (Cox & Miles 2013, pg. 93). Although slated to enhance public safety by removing "criminal aliens" convicted of serious offenses, S-Comm has broaden its scope to achieve attrition in the undocumented immigrant population more generally by also focusing on the removal of those who violate low-level and immigration laws, as well as those who have recently entered the U.S. illegally. Its implementation and enforcement procedures, however, have been found to disproportionately target foreign-born Mexican residents relative to other undocumented

individuals, which may lead to negative consequences for S-Comm's efficacy. Has S-Comm effectively reduced the size of the Mexican immigrant population in the U.S.? Exploiting the variation in the timing of its implementation as well as the disparate levels of its enforcement, my research extends a quasi-experimental design to investigate S-Comm's effect on the size of local Mexican immigrant populations. Testing the influence of S-Comm's implementation and enforcement will reveal the salience of passing laws that target unauthorized migration—an empirical contribution to previous work that has only assessed state and local policies. Moreover, such results may also enhance theoretical knowledge of punitive practices formulated to produce deterrence.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	vi
List of Figures	vii
Introduction.....	1
Background	7
Literature Review.....	11
Population Gain Effect.....	11
No Population Effect.....	13
Population Loss Effect.....	15
Current Study	19
Data & Methods	20
Data	20
Measures	21
Analytical strategy	23
Results.....	25
Descriptive	25
Regression Results.....	29
S-Comm's Enforcement Effect	29
S-Comm's Effects: Implementation or Enforcement?	30
S-Comm's Dual Implementation & Enforcement Effects.....	31
Discussion & Conclusion.....	33
Limitations	34
Policy Implications	35
Appendix.....	38
References.....	39

List of Tables

Table 1:	Descriptive statistics	26
Table 2:	Coefficients from the OLS Regresion of Change in the Number of Mexican Immigrants on S-Comm Effects.....	29

List of Figures

Figure 1:	Secure Communities Jurisdictions	22
Figure 2:	Post 2011 S-Comm Activations.....	42

Introduction

With over one billion dollars budgeted to identify and deport “illegal aliens,” the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transformed immigration enforcement with the nation’s newest and vastest policy, Secure Communities (S-Comm). Since its 2008 inception, S-Comm has become activated in all U.S. counties and represents “the largest expansion of local involvement in immigration enforcement in the nation’s history” (Cox & Miles 2013, pg. 93). S-Comm mandates information sharing between local police departments and DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency in order to streamline the detention and deportation of undocumented residents (DHS 2013). Slated to enhance public safety by removing “criminal aliens” convicted of serious offenses, S-Comm authorizes local law enforcement agents to check the immigration status of every arrestee taken into custody—generally before those persons received any conviction or even trial (Kohli, et al. 2011). As a result, most of those removed by the S-Comm program have been largely law-abiding.¹ Though such deportations appear contrary to its stated purpose, Director of ICE, John Morton, recently explained that the program also seeks to reduce the overall unauthorized immigrant population by focusing on the removal of those who have “repeatedly violated our immigration laws, or have recently entered the United States” (DHS 2012), in addition to individuals who pose risks to public safety. While confusion regarding its scope has inspired recent attention and investigation concerning S-Comm’s wavering efficacy, the extent to which S-Comm

¹ Only 25% of those removed by the S-Comm program have been charged with or convicted of an aggravated felony, whereas over 30% of all those removed experienced unlawful contact due to low level offenses such as traffic violations or civil infractions (DHS 2013).

achieves its purpose of decreasing the undocumented immigrant population in the U.S. remains uncertain. Has S-Comm led to reductions in the size of unauthorized residents living in the U.S.?

Designed to achieve ‘attrition through enforcement,’ S-Comm aims to reduce the unauthorized population by increasing immigrants’ risks associated with undocumented residency—leading to voluntary deportation—as well as intensifying their probability of facing detection—resulting in forced removal (Vaughan 2006). Previous studies on the effects of similar laws, however, have largely reported that such immigration policies do not deter unauthorized migration or reduce the size of the undocumented population (but see Chalfin 2013). Moreover, other factors unrelated to the threat or sanctions of deportation have been found to predict the likelihood of unauthorized migration. For example, the manner by which immigration policy is perceived by immigrants and carried out by enforcers greatly influences undocumented residents’ propensities to obey those laws (see Ryo 2013). Such findings present a potential threat to S-Comm’s efficacy due to a recent report suggesting the program could lead to racial profiling practices. Cox and Miles (2013) discovered that DHS prioritized S-Comm’s activation in areas not with high rates of crime, but in regions densely populated with foreign-born and non-citizen Latinos. During the first 18 months of S-Comm’s rollout (October 2008 - April 2010), activated counties were geographically scattered throughout particular areas of the U.S., suggesting that those counties were chosen carefully and deliberately (hereafter “high priority”). Counties activated in the latter timeline of the rollout (May 2010 - 2013), however, were more likely to receive S-Comm as the result of an entire statewide

adoption (hereafter “low priority”). The authors conclude that the rollout strategy reflected an ethnically disparate impact.

If S-Comm’s prioritized activation process results in either perceived or actual ethnic profiling among Latinos, they may become more likely to enter the U.S. illegally and those already residing in the U.S. may become less likely to self-deport since negative perceptions of the law and its enforcers weakens individuals’ likelihood for legal compliance (Tyler 2002; Ryo 2013), thereby diminishing S-Comm’s ability to achieve attrition in the unauthorized immigrant population. Thus, I extend S-Comm’s activation dichotomy to test the effects of its prioritized implementation on the number of Mexican immigrants across U.S. counties. Mexican immigrants represent a critical group for analysis not only because of their disproportionately large share of the overall unauthorized population in the U.S., but also due to their distinctly received scrutiny as demonstrated through S-Comm deportations. In 2010, though Mexican immigrants made up an estimated 58% of the undocumented population in the U.S., they represented nearly three-quarters of all unauthorized removals (Lopez, et al. 2011). Accordingly, in addition to evaluating its implementation, I also aim to investigate S-Comm’s enforcement on the Mexican immigrant population by measuring the number of its county-level deportations. The categorically unique attention and disparate treatment received among foreign-born Mexicans in regards to immigration policy deem them well suited to examine S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement. Moreover, a focus on the effect of prioritization elucidates greater information on areas that were strategically enforced by DHS, leading to salient policy implications. S-Comm’s effect within high priority counties is also

important to understand since such communities largely represent traditional settlement destinations for Latino immigrants, and thus my results may advance existing demographic literature on Latino immigrants' changing settlement patterns (Fairchild & Simpson 2004; Frey 2002, 2006; Saenz 2004; Suro & Tafoya 2005; Massey 2008; McConnell 2008; Vásquez, et al. 2008).

Exploiting the variation in the timing of its implementation as well as the disparate levels of its enforcement, my research extends a quasi-experimental design to investigate the efficacy of the nation's most widespread immigration policy, Secure Communities (S-Comm). I employ a first difference approach within ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to assess the following questions: (1) Has S-Comm's prioritized implementation led to disparate changes in the Mexican immigrant population across high and low priority jurisdictions? Specifically, have high priority counties experienced greater reductions in the number of their foreign-born Mexican immigrants within a county relative to low priority jurisdictions? (2) Is S-Comm's enforcement associated with changes in the number of Mexican immigrants? Particularly, are reductions in the size of the Mexican immigrant population positively associated with the number of deportations within a county? Lastly, (3) are high priority areas that demonstrate high levels of enforcement uniquely predictive of attrition in the size of Mexican immigrants?

I hypothesize that Mexican immigrants will respond negatively to S-Comm's prioritized implementation and targeted deportation efforts and subsequently relocate away from areas where they feel highly scrutinized. Therefore, I predict that high priority

counties will experience greater reductions in the number of their foreign-born Mexican population relative to low priority counties due to the unique attention and resources dedicated to prioritized areas. Although I expect that implementation will lead to reductions in the number of local Mexican immigrants, I anticipate that deportation enforcement will have a greater influence on the size of foreign-born Mexican residents within a county than mere high priority activation. I thus hypothesize that the level of S-Comm enforcement will be significantly negatively correlated with the number of local Mexican immigrant residents, and that this effect will mediate such reductions achieved through high priority implementation. Finally, I expect that highly prioritized and enforced areas will demonstrate the largest reductions in the size of their Mexican immigrant population relative to low priority and lesser enforcing counties.

By completing one of the first thorough evaluations of S-Comm's efficacy, I hope to not only contribute to previous research on the changing settlement patterns among Latinos as well as the precarious effects of immigration policy on unauthorized populations, but also to advance theoretical knowledge on the consequences of immigrants' perceptions of legal policy and procedure more generally.

I begin this paper by providing a brief history of immigration laws preceding S-Comm and go onto present this policy's broadening aims, implementation process, and procedures. I then review previous research on legal compliance, deterrence, public perceptions of the law, and legal cynicism, as well as demographic literature on international migration in order to synthesize these separate yet complementary bodies of work. Next, I introduce my data, measures, and methodology. I then present my results

and describe my findings. Lastly, I discuss the broader theoretical and policy implications uncovered by my results and suggest areas and techniques for future related investigations.

Background

The chief procedure broadening the net to catch undocumented residents is the allocation of immigration enforcement duties from federal to state and local officials. Since the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act's Section 287(g) [287(g)] precedent decision to expand the power of immigration enforcement, local police officers began to receive training from federal officials to identify, process, and detain suspected undocumented immigrants for subsequent deportation (Tsankov & Martin 2010). Although intended as a widespread effort, 287(g) became activated within only 39 local law enforcement agencies in 19 states. Frustrated with the national deficit of 287(g) a few states implemented their own strategies to increase immigration enforcement.² While a handful of states provide examples of local efforts to expand deportation, Arizona and Alabama represent the first and strictest measures respectively.

Named the nation's "toughest bill on illegal immigration," Arizona's State Bill 1070 (SB 1070) exemplifies the trend toward draconian immigration enforcement (*New York Times* 2010). Arizona passed SB 1070 in 2010, requiring all unauthorized individuals over the age of 14 to register with the Federal Government if their stay in the U.S. was longer than 30 days and to subsequently possess their registration documents at all times. Undocumented individuals caught without their documents received a criminal misdemeanor charge and consequently faced deportation. Furthermore, state and local law enforcement agents were required to determine one's immigration status during

² States such as Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah passed laws that transfer power from federal authorities to local police for immigration enforcement.

unlawful acts or lawful contact if there was suspicion that the individual was undocumented, which additionally increased the detection and deportation of unauthorized residents.

Alabama ratified comparable legislation in September 2011 with its House Bill 56 (HB 56), requiring similar detection efforts from its local law enforcement agents to determine citizenship status among those suspected of illegal residency. Surpassing SB 1070's harsh measures (*Los Angeles Times* 2011) HB 56 also prohibits unauthorized residents from receiving any social assistance benefits or attending public colleges or universities. HB 56 also mandates unauthorized elementary, middle, and high school students to register as undocumented, and orders public schools to share their lists of undocumented students with state and federal agencies. Though SB 1070 and HB 56 have been met with vehement disapproval, legal challenges, and appeals, both bills remain active to some degree and continue to place economic and social burdens on individuals and businesses involving both unauthorized residents and citizens (Arrocha 2011; Addy 2012).

Recognizing local areas' efforts and inclinations, DHS created its own partnership agreement between ICE and local police departments with its S-Comm policy. Similar to its state bill counterparts, S-Comm requires local police to check the immigration status of every arrestee in their custody and detain those suspected of being undocumented until ICE determines their residency. Though S-Comm does not require many of the additional strict measures applied in Arizona or Alabama, it boasts national coverage and casts a wide net on unauthorized residents, despite its original stated priority to deport

immigrants who pose a threat to public safety. Responding to requests for transparency and clarification of intentions from the Homeland Security Advisory Council, ICE Director Morton released a taskforce report addressing the recommendations for S-Comm's operations. Indeed, Morton clarifies that although "ICE's highest priority is aliens [sic] who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety...ICE also prioritizes recent illegal entrants, individuals who have repeatedly violated immigration laws, and aliens who are fugitives" (DHS 2012). Required to categorize deportees' level of offenses, S-Comm includes any unlawful act punishable by less than one year of jail time as part of its prioritized enforcement in order to include civil immigration law violators and those charged with or convicted of misdemeanors and other minor offenses including traffic laws. Other S-Comm advocates have made public statements to elucidate S-Comm's intentions, including Jessica Vaughan, the Director of Policy Studies for the Center of Immigration Studies. In her 2012 interview with FOX News in Massachusetts, Vaughan stated that ICE "oversold the idea that they will go after violent criminals." She also adds, "Violent criminals are the *priority*; they're not the *only* target, though."

Broadening their scope to ostensibly include every immigrant whose residency is unauthorized, S-Comm's efforts should presumably lead to attrition in the size of the nation's unauthorized immigrant population through its widespread punitive and deterrence framework. Consequently, both the implementation and enforcement of S-Comm should reduce the number of Mexican immigrants across local communities in part due to the upsurge of deportations (i.e., enforcement) but also as a result of

undocumented residents' heightened propensities to emigrate to their countries of origin due to S-Comm's pervasive efforts for their detection and ultimate removal (i.e., implementation). However, our existing knowledge of S-Comm's relationship with the number of Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. remains unclear. Furthermore, theoretical assumptions regarding immigrants' legal noncompliance with negatively perceived laws and those that practice racial and ethnic profiling threaten S-Comm's efficacy.

Though previous studies on state and local immigration legislations' ability to reduce the undocumented immigrant population have produced mixed results (Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Espenshade 1994; 1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007; Addy 2012; Parrado 2013; Ryo 2013), S-Comm's ubiquitous implementation and widespread enforcement offers the first extensive opportunity to unveil U.S. immigration policy's national efficacy—particularly opportune while the rate of unauthorized immigration remains stagnant.³ Stagnant rates of immigration permit a more accurate interpretation of the effects of immigration policy, since migration flows remain relatively unchanging. Testing S-Comm's influence on the Mexican immigrant population will reveal whether immigration policy results in attrition of the unauthorized immigrant population, or if such laws remain ineffective at high economic and social costs.

³ The Pew Hispanic Center reports that the unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. has continuously and significantly waned by about one million persons after growing 43% between 2000 and 2007, reaching a peak size of 12 million (Pew Hispanic Center 2011). Furthermore, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that Mexican net migration, which accounts for about 60% of all unauthorized migration to the U.S., dropped to zero after topping its highest levels in 2007 (Passel, et al. 2013).

Literature Review

Expanding power, resources, and authority for immigration enforcement reflects a systematic attempt to increase the certainty and severity of punishment for unauthorized migration. As the nation's most extensive effort to involve local authorities in the detection of undocumented immigrants, S-Comm relies on the ubiquitous threat and enforcement of deportation to generate attrition. While designed to reduce the undocumented immigrant population, previous studies on the effects of similar laws as well as theoretical contributions that predict reactions to and compliance with such policies offer a variety of possible population outcomes. I will review existing research and theories to illustrate S-Comm's potential effects on the nation's Mexican immigrant population including: population gain, no population change, and population loss.

Population Gain Effect

S-Comm's ethnically targeted activations and disparate deportation efforts could lead to negative perceptions of this law among Mexican immigrants resulting in population growths, especially within high priority areas as well as those that carry out a great deal of enforcement. Contemporary theories predicting lawfulness rest on positive perceptions of legal institutions and officials. For example, Tyler (2002) found that legal authorities greatly influence the public's assessments and judgments of the law and its legitimacy, which, in turn, predicts the likelihood of compliance with the law. Consequently, when individuals experience or perceive unfair treatment from legal authorities, their propensity to cooperate with and follow the law diminishes (ibid). This process, however, is not unique to individuals; it is also cultural (Kirk & Papachristos

2011). Through social interaction, negative experiences with the law become part of the neighborhood milieu. Such perceptions permeate in the form of legal cynicism to other individuals in that community regardless of whether or not they had any direct negative experiences with legal authorities (ibid). Applying these theoretical contributions to immigrant groups, Kirk and colleagues (2012) found that immigrant communities are generally more cooperative with and less cynical of the law than native-born communities. However, trends toward localized immigration enforcement may undermine the positive views of the law currently found in immigrant communities with consequences for immigration policy defiance.

For example, Ryo (2013) demonstrates that migrants rationalize their illegal entry because they perceive the U.S. federal immigration system as illegitimate. Utilizing survey data collected through the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), Ryo found that net of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, individuals' perceptions of procedural justice greatly influenced their deference of the U.S. immigration system. Accordingly, undocumented residents' negative sentiments toward immigration law explain their disobedience. The most salient variable predicting Mexican immigrants' perceptions of U.S. immigration policy and its enforcers was the belief that immigration services treat immigrants with lighter skin better than Mexicans. Relatedly, many legal studies have established that racial profiling practices attenuate positive perceptions of legal authorities and diminish their legitimacy to the public (see Tyler 2002), ultimately decreasing targeted racial and ethnic minorities' cooperation with and compliance of the law. Consequently, if Mexican immigrants feel unfairly and ethnically targeted by S-

Comm's prioritized implementation and disparate enforcement efforts, high priority areas as well as those that carry out a great deal of enforcement could experience growth in the size of their foreign-born Mexican population.

No Population Effect

Alternatively, S-Comm's implementation and enforcement could demonstrate no change on the Mexican immigrant population. Prioritization and deportation could show no significant relationship with the number of foreign-born Mexican residents while other variables typically associated with migration within demographic literature, such as economic conditions and employment opportunities, could maintain their predictive force on the migration flows of Mexican immigrants. For example, as the leading economic concept within international migration, neoclassical theory suggests that individuals weigh migratory decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis. Under neoclassical theory, migrants are expected to settle in destinations where they may maximize their economic wages, which often results in movement from low- to high-wage countries reflecting an imbalance in the international supply and demand for labor (Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1976; Borjas 1999). Subsequent economics models such as dual labor market and world systems theory further explain how such instabilities in the supply and demand for products generates a secondary employment sector characterized by low-skill, low-wage, and high-turnover occupations. Such capricious job opportunities typically attract unauthorized immigrants who are willing to work without formal pay or benefits earned in the formal economy (Wallerstein 1974; Piore 1979).

Applying traditional theories to undocumented migration from Mexico to the U.S. explains that individuals are likely to migrate if they expect that their earning potential outweighs the risks associated with their illegal entry, including facing apprehension at the border or eventual deportation. Some researchers have employed economic theories to test the efficacy of immigration policy for understanding undocumented residents' illegal migration, and most results support the idea that economic gains outweigh the risks for unauthorized migration. For example, utilizing time-series data on apprehensions made at the U.S.-Mexico border, Espenshade (1994) found that U.S. border control policies have been ineffective in reducing or deterring unauthorized migration. Examining its deterrence technique for stemming unauthorized migration, Espenshade uncovered that increasing the barriers for crossing the border has not discouraged illegal entry. Rather, undocumented individuals adapt more clandestine strategies and increasingly dangerous entry points to avoid apprehension (Espenshade 1994; 1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007). Furthermore, migrants from Mexico have been shown to almost always make repeated attempts at reentry to the U.S. until they achieve successful entrance (Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007).

Testing the particular effects of immigration legislation passed in 2006 that introduced heightened surveillance, advances in monitoring technologies, and integrated fencing at the U.S.-Mexican border, Cornelius and Salehyan (2007) conclude that such efforts to stem unauthorized immigration by deterrence is largely ineffective. The authors use survey data from recent returnees and potential future migrants collected in rural Mexico and found that undocumented immigrants' motivation for illegal entry was

significantly related with their perceived economic opportunities offered in the United States. The survey results also indicated that undocumented immigrants' aspirations to improve the lives of their families dwarfed the potential dangers associated with their unauthorized residency.

In one of the latest investigations of deterrent-based immigration policy, Parrado (2013) revealed a similar scenario of ineffective outcomes in his evaluation of the locally-activated federal immigration program 287(g). In his recent analysis on the effect of participating in the 287(g) partnership agreement, Parrado (2013) found little support that the program led to any changes in the size of local Mexican immigrant populations. The author found instead that shifts in the labor market demand for low-skilled jobs had a salient association with the number of Mexican immigrants across local areas. Although Parrado found little overall support for 287(g)'s efficacy, he identified a few outlier metropolitan areas (Phoenix, Los Angeles, Riverside, and Dallas) that experienced reductions in the size of their Mexican immigrant populations. Parrado explains that the outliers represent jurisdictions where officials strongly enforced 287(g), and proposes that only those locations that executed extreme measures effectively achieved attrition (ibid).

Population Loss Effect

Although previous studies examining U.S. immigration policies' capacity to reduce the undocumented immigrant population largely report unsuccessful results, descriptive evidence from Arizona's SB 1070 and Alabama's HB 56 provide a glimpse into how the expansion of immigration enforcement has impacted unauthorized

immigrants' exodus. Arizona experienced a 23% reduction in their undocumented immigrant population only one year after SB 1070's activation. The number of unauthorized immigrants in Arizona declined from 470,000 in 2010 to 360,000 in 2011 (DHS 2011). Alabama's HB 56 likewise produced mass emigration among the state's unauthorized residents. An estimated 80,000 unauthorized immigrant workers (Addy 2012) and more than 5% of Alabama's Latino public school students went missing after the law went into effect on September 28, 2011 (The Department of Education 2011). Fox News (2011) reports "...scores of immigrant families have withdrawn their children from classes or kept them home this week, afraid that sending the kids to school would draw attention from authorities." Fearful of deportation or familial separation, residents willingly fled places like Arizona and Alabama without facing direct contact with authorities.

Evidence from SB 1070 and HB 56 that correlates the mere implementation of punitive deterrent policies with attrition in the number of undocumented residents, however, is limited since the effects of SB 1070 and HB 56 were not rigorously tested. Moreover, such population reductions could be mere reflections of initial policy shock. Laws receiving extensive public and media attention often generate immediate but not sustainable changes. For example, the 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which posed similar restrictions on unauthorized immigrants in order to stem illegal migration, demonstrated a successful effect on reducing the flow of unauthorized Mexican migration for only one year (Donato et al. 1992). Forthcoming work, however, supports descriptive evidence from DHS regarding SB 1070's influence

on foreign-born Mexican emigration. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, Chaflin (2013) found that Arizona's SB 1070 was strongly associated with reductions in the state's foreign-born Mexican population. While the law showed no effect among other foreign-born groups or native-born Latinos, estimates from the American Community Survey show that the foreign-born Mexican population declined by nearly 20%.

As suggested by Parrado (2013) and supported by descriptive and robust evidence, the operative strategy for decreasing the unauthorized immigrant population appears to involve stringent measures and strong enforcement. However, although Parrado posits that uniquely tough enforcement was associated with reductions in the size of the Mexican immigrant populations in areas that participated in 287(g), his justification for naming such outliers vigorous enforcers only reflects anecdotal evidence and local reputations. No empirical measure was used to capture variance in the level of deportations carried out across jurisdictions. Likewise, while Chalfin (2013) found strong evidence for enduring reductions in the Mexican immigrant population in Arizona associated with SB 1070, his analysis lacked enforcement reports. Offering measures of both implementation and enforcement, S-Comm embodies a unique opportunity to examine immigration policy's effect on reducing undocumented populations. Furthermore, while previous research has reported mixed results on U.S. immigration policies' ability to effectively thwart unauthorized migration, such findings only reflect a small number of laws implemented within non-generalizable state and local jurisdictions. S-Comm provides researchers rich data to investigate its efficacy as well as the chance to

enhance theoretical models explaining unauthorized migration patterns and undocumented residents' legal compliance with nationwide generalizability.

Current Study

Utilizing county-level data on the timing of S-Comm activation and the number of subsequent deportations, this research tests the effects of both policy implementation and tangible enforcement on the size of local Mexican immigrant populations in order to elucidate whether S-Comm has met its primary aim of reducing the number of unauthorized residents living in the U.S. Testing the influence of S-Comm activation will reveal the salience of passing laws that target unauthorized migration—an empirical contribution to previous work that has only assessed state and local policies. Moreover, such results may also enhance theoretical knowledge of punitive practices formulated to produce deterrence. I also endeavor to provide evidence for policymakers’ intentions of “attrition through enforcement” (Vaughan 2006) by further exploring the consequences of deportation by estimating the effect of the number of removals across local areas. By investigating the influence of S-Comm’s implementation *and* enforcement on the size of the U.S. Mexican immigrant population, this paper will present one of the first thorough evaluations of the nation’s most prevalent immigration policy, and will also advance our limited theoretical knowledge on the effects of hostile contexts and legal compliance among undocumented residents.

Data & Methods

Data

My analysis concentrates on the change in the size of the foreign-born Mexican population measured at two time points in order to capture the effects of S-Comm's implementation and enforcement. Estimates from the American Community Survey (ACS) were used to provide county-level information on changes in the size of the Mexican immigrant population as well as for a variety of socio-demographic variables that served as control variables. Literature on the techniques of modeling legal impacts recommends comparing jurisdictions before and after the passage of the policy of interest in order to achieve valid comparisons of behavioral patterns following the law (Lempert 1966). Accordingly, I collected ACS estimates at two time points in order to represent changes in the population and social conditions associated with the year before S-Comm began its implementation (2007), as well as the most recent year for which national ACS estimates are available (2011). The final data represents complete information for all counties within the contiguous U.S. (N=3,109).

In order to assess S-Comm's effects on the size of the Mexican immigrant population, I merged the ACS data with information on the dates of each county's S-Comm activation as well as its subsequent number of deportations provided by DHS. DHS offers annual reports on the number of S-Comm deportations for each county in the U.S., and because the population estimates only reflect changes up to 2011, I restricted the number of deportations accordingly. Though legal impact studies often suffer the

potential of disparate instrumentation⁴ within data sources (Lempert 1966), both DHS and ACS collect, measure, and report their data uniformly which helps to minimize the possibility of internal validity threats within my investigation.

Measures

The dependent variable for this analysis is the change in the number of Mexican immigrants. It represents in raw change across counties from before DHS began in implementation process in 2008 to after the majority of counties across the U.S. had been activated in 2011. The key predictor variables include a measure for S-Comm's prioritized implementation as well as a quantification of its enforcement. Prioritization is measured as a dichotomous variable; high priority counties are identified as those that were activated within the first 18 months of S-Comm's rollout activation (N=162). Since S-Comm has currently achieved full-scale implementation, all other counties, whether or not they had activated S-Comm by the end of 2011 received a zero for the binary priority variable. Figure 1 displays high and low priority counties consistent with my categorizations; Figure 2 available in the appendix illustrates what counties throughout the U.S. were activated after 2011.

⁴ "Changes in the calibration of a measuring instrument or changes in the observers or scores used may produce changes in the obtained measurement (Campbell 1957).

Secure Communities Jurisdictions




Figure 1.

Enforcement was captured as a relative measure of the number of S-Comm removals that accounts for the risk of and need for deportations within a county. It was constructed by dividing the number of reported deportations by the number of years each county has respectively had S-Comm by 2011 (zero to three years) to generate the number of yearly deportations within each county. The number of yearly deportations was then divided the number of Mexican immigrants before S-Comm began its activation within each county in order to account for the relative risk and need for enforcement.

Legal impact studies must control for plausible rival factors (Lempert 1966) in order to minimize threats of internal validity presented in quasi-experimental designs. Accordingly, I control for possible sources of plausible rival hypotheses that may also reasonably explain changes in the Mexican immigrant population. Since job opportunities and financial incentives have largely predicted the size of immigrant groups across the U.S., I control for a variety of economic conditions in order to evaluate whether S-Comm has an effect on the number of Mexican immigrants above and beyond expected monetary cost-benefits. I control for the changes in unemployment in general, as well as changes in opportunities in both the high- and low-skilled labor market. Replicating Parrado's (2013) measures for high- and low-skilled employment, I calculate changes in jobs in which Mexican immigrants disproportionately work, as well as jobs that typically employ highly educated, non-Latino whites in order to net out changes in job opportunities that affect diverse echelons. I therefore include controls for the number of people employed in occupations characterized within agriculture, construction, and retail (low-skilled employment), as well as those within finance, professional, and public administration industries (high-skilled employment). To further test the confounding effects of housing availability, I also control for changes in county-level homeownership.

Analytical Strategy

Although estimating population change may be performed using a variety of statistical techniques, one of the most supported methods for capturing change across two waves of data is through a change score (CS) approach. The CS model has been lauded as

the preferred approach for measuring the effect of change for non-experimental data (Allison 1994) since it avoids biased estimators by excluding the initial level of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation while also controlling for all unobserved heterogeneity across observations (Allison 1990; 1994).

Investigating the effects of laws presents a variety of hurdles due to the inability to compare behavior patterns in areas had the law of interest never been implemented. Furthermore, researchers cannot assign experimental and control groups through a random selection process since laws are mandated through legal processes. The time and place of a given law's passage also present risks to legal impact studies due to the correlation between laws' enactments and public attitudes and feelings about a particular issue. However, such a selection limitation, considered the most severe threat the legal impact studies (Lempert 1966) is largely a non-issue for my examination of S-Comm since all jurisdictions across the U.S. were eventually required to activate the partnership agreement regardless of local belief systems.

Each variable in the CS equation represents the difference between values at time two and time one. Thus, a CS analysis uncovers the extent to which the predictor variable(s) influenced the change in the dependent variable from time one to time two. Such models represent a fixed effects assumption and allow account for time-varying information. The equation may be expressed as the following:

$$Y_2 - Y_1 = \delta_1(X_1 - X_0) + u_2 - u_1$$

Results

Descriptive

I begin by describing the key variables in the study. Table 1 displays the average values for the outcome variable, the key predictor variables, as well as the complete set of controls. The mean of the outcome variable, change in the size of the Mexican immigrant population, shows that the U.S. experienced an average growth of about 106 persons from before S-Comm began its activation process to 2011. However, the standard deviation of nearly 2,000 persons reflects the extreme variation in the change of foreign-born Mexican residents experienced across 3,109 counties within the contiguous U.S.

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics*Average values for all statistical variables.*

	<u>High Priority</u>	<u>Low Priority</u>	<u>Total Counties</u>
Secure Communities Jurisdictions	162	2,947	3,109
Dependent Variables			
Change in the Number of Mexican Immigrants	101.3 (7,609.0)	106.7 (554.1)	106.4 (1,813.9)
Key Predictor Variables			
Enforcement	1.5 (1.8)	1.6 (6.7)	1.6 (6.6)
Yearly Deportations ¹	384.4 (265.4)	11.3 (1,071.2)	30.7 (65.9)
Control Variables²			
<i>Socioeconomic Characteristics</i>			
Unemployment	5,698.4 (11,090.7)	537.4 (537.4)	806.3 (3,289.5)
Homeownership	1,029.3 (5,630.3)	132.2 (1,113.7)	178.9 (1,690.5)
<i>Low-Skilled Occupations</i>			
Agriculture	268.9 (635.0)	15.7 (187.2)	28.9 (239.3)
Construction	-2,167.3 (4,960.4)	-178.7 (688.6)	-282.3 (1,385.4)
Retail	283.8 (1,926.2)	3.8 (392.8)	18.4 (585.1)
<i>High-Skilled Occupations</i>			
Finance	-795.4 (2,404.3)	-56.7 (470.9)	-95.2 (732.6)
Professional	890.4 (1,892.1)	86.1 (496.7)	128.0 (671.7)
Public Administration	569.2 (1,264.8)	57.7 (296.9)	84.3 (406.0)

N = 3,109*Sources*: Information gathered from the Department of Homeland Security and the American Community Survey.¹ Only shown here for reference; this variable was not included in subsequent statistical modeling.² All control variables were specified as the absolute change in the number from before to after S-Comm implementation.

Surprisingly, the difference in the change in the number of Mexican immigrants between high and low priority counties was very marginal on average. High priority counties experienced growth of about 101 Mexican immigrant residents on average while low priority counties experienced an increase of almost 107 individuals on average from prior to post S-Comm activation periods. Such patterns evident in both high and low priority counties reflect the overall nationwide trend in the average change in the number of local Mexican immigrants. Yet, the seemingly trivial differences in the change in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents are masked by this population's relative contribution within local communities. For instance, though an increase of 101 persons illustrates only a .24% increase in the number of Mexican immigrants within high priority counties, the similar contribution of about 107 persons in low priority areas represents an increase of about 7% in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents.⁵ Evident from the Figure 1 and consistent with its prioritized activation, S-Comm was launched in areas where Mexican immigrants made up a disproportionate number of residents relative to white and citizen inhabitants.

While the yearly number of deportations was much greater in high than low priority areas, the relative level of enforcement, which accounts for the number of at-risk Mexican immigrant residents in the denominator of the measure, was quite similar in both county categorizations. The standard deviation, however, reveals that low priority areas exhibited much greater variability in their levels of enforcement than high priority

⁵ The average number of foreign-born Mexican residents within high priority counties increased from 42,025 to 42,127 persons whereas this population grew from 1,521 to 1,628 individuals in low priority counties.

areas, which only showed a standard deviation of about 1.8 relative to 6.7 in low priority counties.

Indeed, the socio-demographic characteristics across high and low priority jurisdictions also showed disparate environments that likely influence migration patterns among Mexican immigrant groups. In his examination of 287(g), Parrado (2013) found that diminished job opportunities in the low-skill labor market in general, but in the construction industry in particular, were highly correlated with attrition in the size and growth of the Mexican immigrant population. Consequently, the higher levels in the change in unemployment as well as the large reductions in the number of construction-related jobs found within high relative to low priority areas may drive these counties' potential reductions found in the change in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents.

TABLE 2. Coefficients from the OLS Regression of Change in the Number of Mexican Immigrants on S-Comm Effects

Variables	Change in the Number of Mexican Immigrants			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Key Predictors				
Priority	1024.257 *		1010.810 *	1208.582 **
Enforcement		.932	.910	1.486
Priority*Enforcement				-131.361
Controls				
<i>Socioeconomic Characteristics</i>				
Unemployment	.099	.099	.093	.090
Homeownership	-.146 *	-.146 *	-.149 *	-.155 *
<i>Low-Skilled Occupations</i>				
Agriculture	1.350 ***	1.474 ***	1.370 ***	1.356 ***
Construction	.950 **	.919 **	.953 **	.951 **
Retail	.750 **	.751 **	.759 **	.760 **
<i>High-Skilled Occupations</i>				
Finance	.250	.255	.244	.242
Professional	.440 *	.487 *	.437 *	.454 *
Public Administration	-.430	-.405	-.442	-.426
Intercept	222.030 ***	286.210 **	255.084 **	254.378 **
R ²	.550	.541	.553	.554
N	3,109	2,672	2,672	2,672

Robust probability † p < 0.1 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Sources : Information gathered from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the American Community Survey (ACS).

Regression Results

S-Comm's Prioritization Effect

I employed a CS equation to OLS regression to examine my research queries. Table 2 reports the results from the OLS regression of change in the number of Mexican immigrants on S-Comm's implementation and enforcement measures. Column 1 examines S-Comm's prioritized implementation process to test whether it's ethnically

targeted rollout pattern led to disparate changes in the Mexican immigrant population across high and low priority areas. The results indicate that net of economic and labor market conditions, high priority counties experienced a significant growth of over one-thousand persons on average in the size of their Mexican immigrant population relative to low priority jurisdictions. Thus, my expectation to find reductions in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents within high relative to low priority counties was not supported in my results. In fact, my first model predicted an average increase of about 2.5% from the initial average population of 42,025 to the predicted size of 43,050.

Although many of the control variables also displayed significant correlations with the change in the number of foreign-born Mexican residents, the values were not substantively meaningful. For example, aside from the change in the number of agriculture-related jobs, none of the statistically significant control variables exhibited coefficients larger than one (person).

S-Comm's Enforcement Effect

Next I aimed to assess the effect of S-Comm's deportations to test my hypothesis predicting that high levels of enforcement would lead to reductions in the number of local Mexican immigrant residents. Column 2 illustrates that S-Comm's level was not negatively correlated with growth in the number of Mexican immigrant residents. In fact, when controlling for related economic and labor market conditions, S-Comm's level of enforcement was associated with a trivial *growth* in the number of foreign-born Mexican

residents within a county, but this relationship was non-significant. The control variables operated in the same direction and to the same extent as Column 1.

S-Comm's Effects: Implementation or Enforcement

Following my next research question, I tested whether deportation enforcement exhibited a greater influence on the size of local foreign-born Mexican residents within a county than mere high priority activation as I anticipated. My findings, however, suggest a different scenario. Not only does Column 3 show that S-Comm's level of enforcement was not significantly negatively correlated with the change in the number of local Mexican immigrants, but enforcement demonstrated a much smaller effect on this population's change relative to S-Comm's prioritization activation process. Although the predicted number of foreign-born Mexican residents was reduced when controlling for enforcement, the results from Column 3 largely reflect those found in Column 1.

Controlling for economic and labor market characteristics as well as S-Comm's level of enforcement, high priority implementation was associated with a growth in the Mexican immigrant population by about one-thousand persons on average relative to low priority counties. The growth predicted in Column 3 reflects a 2.4% increase from 42,025 to 43,036 Mexican immigrants residing in high priority counties on average—a .01% decrease from the values predicted in Column 1. Again, the control variables operated in the same direction and to the same extent as column 1.

S-Comm's Dual Implementation & Enforcement Effects

Lastly, I expected that highly prioritized and enforced areas would demonstrate

the largest reductions in the size of their Mexican immigrant population relative to low priority and lesser enforcing counties. I tested my expectations by integrating an interaction effect between S-Comm's prioritization and its level of enforcement. The results in Column 4 continue to express similar results from the previous models among all variables. In accordance with my hypothesis, however, the interaction between S-Comm's prioritization and enforcement effects demonstrated attrition in the number of Mexican immigrants. Controlling for economic conditions, labor market opportunities, as well as the main effects of high priority and enforcement, the interaction variable predicted a decrease of over 130 foreign-born Mexican residents within highly prioritized and greatly enforcing areas relative to low prioritization and enforcement counties. Although this finding is consistent with my hypothesis, the result is not statistically significant.

Discussion & Conclusion

Investigating S-Comm's influence on the size of the Mexican immigrant population involved synching information provided by DHS and the ACS. After collecting county-level measures of the change in the size of the Mexican immigrant population, along with corresponding socio-demographic variables typically associated with changes in immigrant populations, I matched such estimates to the respective county-level S-Comm information on the date of activation and the subsequent number of removals. In doing so, I created a comprehensive dataset to assess whether S-Comm's implementation and enforcement were independently and collectively associated with changes in the number of county-level Mexican immigrant residents.

Applying CS techniques with OLS regression, my analysis reveals that S-Comm's implementation was associated with an increase of over 1,000 local Mexican immigrant residents within high relative to low priority counties. S-Comm's level of enforcement was also positively associated with the number of Mexican immigrants, but such results were not statistically significant. Moreover, the relationship between enforcement and the change in the size of the foreign-born Mexican population was neither substantively salient, since the coefficient—reflecting the number of persons—was less than one. The results for S-Comm's prioritized implementation remained significant and similar in size (from 1,024.3 to 1,010.8) when the level of enforcement was controlled for in the model, and enforcement displayed a relatively unwavering coefficient, as well. Consistent with previous studies on whether local immigration policy effectively reduced the size of the nation's unauthorized population (Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Espenshade 1994;

1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007; Parrado 2013; Ryo 2013), my results indicate that neither implementation nor enforcement have independently led to attrition in the number of Mexican immigrant residents.

Accounting for the potential unique climate associated with highly prioritized and enforced areas, I tested whether the interaction of my key predictor variables produced a significant relationship with the change in the number of local Mexican immigrants.

While my previous hypotheses were not supported by my results, the interaction between high priority counties and enforcement displayed a negative association with the change in the size of the foreign-born Mexican population. High priority counties that actively enforced deportation experienced a reduction of about 131.4 persons on average relative to low priority counties and those areas that did not employ great levels of enforcement. However, the interaction effect was not significant when I accounted for robust standard errors. While such results indicate a successful model for producing attrition, my findings largely suggest that S-Comm does not achieve its intention of reducing the overall unauthorized resident population living in the U.S. as demonstrated through the prevalence of Mexican immigrants.

Limitations

Though I employed CS techniques to assess change across two periods of time and, my study—like much research interested in uncovering the impacts of laws—faces substantive and design challenges. Alternative ways to achieve a legal impact study involves the comparison of jurisdictions that mirror each other to the extent that

behaviors exhibited in the two sets of jurisdictions would have been the same had the areas not differed with respect to the passage of a particular law (Lempert 1966). Thus, future analysis may consider dropping prioritized counties altogether since such areas indeed represent categorically unique population proportions as well as S-Comm procedures. Indeed, the disparate selection of areas for a comparison group poses a hazard for legal impact studies' internal validity (Campbell 1957). To avoid a selection bias potentially caused by including high priority areas, another method to achieve comparisons across jurisdictions should designate counties chosen for S-Comm activation in 2010 as the treatment group and those counties that received S-Comm in 2012 henceforth as the control group. This design would further minimize plausible rival hypotheses that threaten legal impact studies' validity (Lempert 1966).

Policy Implications

Although originally touted as an effort to enhance public safety by prioritizing the removal of "criminal aliens," S-Comm's activation process has been found to ethnically target Latino residents rather than areas with high rates of crime (Cox & Miles 2013) and its enforcement procedures and restated intentions reveal that the policy casts a much wider net on detecting unauthorized residents to deport. Utilizing a deterrence framework, S-Comm seeks to achieve 'attrition through enforcement' in the nation's undocumented immigrant population. Consistent with previous studies on deterrent models and increased punitive measures and barriers to stem unauthorized migration (Bean, et al. 1990; Kossoudji 1992; Espenshade 1994; 1995; Cornelius & Salehyan 2007; Parrado 2013; Ryo 2013), my results indicate that S-Comm has been ineffective in its

efforts to reduce in the number of foreign-born Mexican immigrants with potential costly consequences for legal compliance.

Prior research on the effects of racial profiling practices among the police suggest that such policing practices lead to negative views of enforcement officers as well as the law more generally—leading to increased propensities toward criminality among targeted racial and ethnic groups (Tyler 2002). Individuals may even cultivate such beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors without direct negative interaction with police if their community is characterized by legal cynicism (Kirk & Papachristos 2011). Such theoretical paradigms thus highlight the probability for Mexican immigrants to defy S-Comm due to the disparate attention and treatment they receive through the policy’s implementation (Cox & Miles 2013) and enforcement (Lopez, et al. 2011). Moreover, evidence from Ryo’s (2013) study likewise discourages enforcement that may lead to negative views of the U.S. immigration system.

Though I hypothesized that Mexican immigrants would respond to such harsh conduct by relocating away from areas where they may feel most scrutinized and shadowed, my results indicate behaviors consistent with ‘trust in the law’ and legal cynicism literature. My research also lends support for non-deterrent strategies in immigration policy design, consistent recent findings that found no significant relationship between unauthorized individuals’ intent to migrate and their perceived risks or severity of sanctions related to their unauthorized migration (Ryo 2013). By revealing S-Comm’s implementation and enforcement effects on the change in the size of the Mexican immigrant population, my analysis offers unique information for theoretical

models explaining legal compliance, as well as offer salient evidence for policy to evade deterrent models when seeking to attenuate unauthorized migration.

Appendix

Post 2011 S-Comm Activations




Figure 2.

References

- Addy, S. (2012). "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the New Alabama Immigration Law." The University of Alabama: Center for Business and Economic Research, Culverhouse College of Commerce and Business Administration.
- Allison, P. D. (1994). "Using Panel Data to Estimate the Effects of Events." *Sociological Methods & Research* 23(2): 174-199.
- _____. (1990). "Change Scores as Dependent Variables in Regression Analysis." Pp. 93-114 in *Sociological Methodology 1990*, edited by Clifford Clogg. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Arrocha, W. (2011). "From Arizona's SB 1070 to Georgia's HB 87 and Alabama's HB 56: Exacerbating the Other and Generating New Discourses and Practices of Segregation." *California Western Law Review* 48(245): 101-134.
- Bean, F. D., B. Edmondston, & J. S. Passel (Eds.). (1990). *Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s* (Vol. 7). The Urban Institute.
- Borjas, G. J. (1999). "The Economics Analysis of Immigration," in *Handbook of Labor Economics*, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David Card. Elsevier B.V.
- Campbell, D. T. (1957). "Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings." *Psychological Bulletin* 54(4): 297-312.
- Chalfin, A. (2013) "New Evidence on Mexican Immigration and U.S. Crime Rates: A Synthetic Control Study of the Legal Arizona Workers Act." *Forthcoming*.
- Cornelius, W. A., & I. Salehyan (2007). "Does Border Enforcement Deter Unauthorized Immigration? The Case of Mexican Migration to the United States of America." *Regulation & Governance* 1(2): 139-153.
- Cox, A. B., & T. J. Miles (2013). "Policing Immigration." University of Chicago Law Review, *Forthcoming*; 7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-48; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 416; U of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 632. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109820>

- Donato, K. M., J. Durand, & D. S. Massey (1992). "Stemming the Tide? Assessing the Deterrent Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act." *Demography* 29(2), 139-157.
- Espenshade, T. J. (1994). Does the threat of border apprehension deter undocumented US immigration? *Population and Development Review* 20(4): 871-892.
- (1995). "Unauthorized Immigration to the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology* 21(1): 195-216.
- Fairchild, S. T., & N. B. Simpson (2004). "Mexican Migration to the United States Pacific Northwest." *Population Research and Policy Review* 23(3):1-16.
- Frey, W. H. (2002). *Census 2000 Reveals New Native-Born and Foreign-Born Shifts Across U.S.* Population Studies Center Research Report 02-520, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
- (2006). *Diversity Spreads Out: Metropolitan Shifts in Hispanic, Asian, and Black Populations Since 2000*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Kirk, D. S., & A.V. Papachristos (2011). "Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood Violence." *American Journal of Sociology* 116(4): 1190-1233.
- Kirk, D. S., et al. (2012). "The Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigrant Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 641(1): 79-98.
- Kohli, A., P. L. Markowitz, & L. Chavez (2011). "Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due Process." The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy, Berkeley, Calif.
- Kossoudji, S. A. (1992). "Playing Cat and Mouse at the US-Mexican Border." *Demography*, 29(2): 159-180.
- Lempert, R. (1966). "Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study-The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses." *Law & Society Review* 1(1): 111-132.
- Lopez, M. H., A. Gonzalez-Barrera, S. Motel (2011). "As Deportations Rise to Record Levels, Most Latinos Oppose Obama's Policy." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center.
- Los Angeles Times* (2011). *Alabama Enacts Anti-Illegal-Immigration Law Described as Nation's Strictest*. Available from:

- <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/10/nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110610>
- Massey, D. S. (Ed.). (2008). *New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- McConnell, E. D. (2008). "The U.S. Destinations of Contemporary Mexican Immigrants." *International Migration Review* 42(4): 767-802.
- New York Times* (2010). *Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration*. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?_r=0
- Parrado, E. A. (2013). "Immigration Enforcement Policies, the Economic Recession, and the Size of Local Mexican Immigrant Populations." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 641(1): 16-37.
- Piore, M. J. (1979). "Qualitative Research Techniques in Economics." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24(4): 560-569.
- Ryo, E. (2013). "Deciding to Cross: The Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration." *American Sociological Review*, Forthcoming.
- Saenz, R. (2004). "Latinos and the Changing Face of America." *Census Brief*. Washington, DC: Population Reference and the Russell Sage Foundation.
- Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration." *The Journal of Political Economy* 70(5): 80-93.
- Suro, R., & S. Tafoya (2004). "Dispersal and Concentration: Patterns of Latino Residential Settlement." Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center.
- Tsankov, M. E., & C. J. Martin (2009). "Measured Enforcement: A Policy Shift in the ICE 287(g) Program." *University of La Verne Law Review* 31(2): 403-450.
- Todaro, M. P. (1976). *Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology, and Research*. Ilo.
- Tyler, T. R. (2002). *Trust in the Law*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Department of Homeland Security (2011). "Homeland Security Advisory Council, Task Force on Secure Communities Findings and Recommendations." Available from: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf>

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2012). *Secure Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics through September 30, 2012*. Available from: http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide_interop_stats-fy2012.pdf
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013). *Activated Jurisdictions*. Available from: <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf>
- Vásquez, M., et al. (2008). "New Latino Destinations." In *Latinos/as in the United States: Changing the Face of América*. Ed. H. Rodríguez, R. Sáenz, and C. Menjívar. New York, NY: Springer. Pp. 19-35.
- Vaughan, J. (2006). "Attrition through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink the Illegal Population." *Backgrounder*. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The Modern World-system: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-economy in the Sixteenth Centenary*. Academic Press.